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UNNERVING THE JUDGES:




I must have hit a nerve! On September 15, 2000, I participated
in Loyola Law School's symposium on the Rampart scandal.' The
focus of my remarks was the responsibility of participants in every
branch of the criminal justice system to critically analyze how they
may have contributed to the Rampart scandal and what reforms can
* Professor of Law & William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles. I am grateful to Professors Samuel H. Pillsbury, and Gary Williams
for their comments on a draft of this work and to my incredible research assis-
tants Dennis Hyun and Trevor Stockinger for their assistance with this Article.
I am also forever in debt to my friend and colleague, Ervin Chemerinsky, for
his thoughtful guidance and leadership.
1. As described in the Symposium's literature, the "Rampart Scandal" re-
fers to recent revelations that as many as seventy officers of the Rampart Divi-
sion of the Los Angeles Police Department falsified evidence in as many as
100 criminal cases, leading to convictions that have been overturned, poten-
tially costing the city one billion dollars in civil lawsuits and raising serious
questions about the current state of criminal justice in Los Angeles. See gen-
erally Tom Hayden, LAPD: Law and Disorder, NATION, Apr. 10, 2000, at 6
(discussing the "violent lawlessness" in the LAPD's anti-gang unit); Matt Lait
& Scott Glover, Police Credibility Debate Could Alter Legal System, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2000, at Al (discussing the effects of the Rampart scandal on
the legal system in Los Angeles); Andrew Murr, L.A. 's Dirty War on Gangs,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 72 (discussing Rafael A. Perez's disclosure of
the Rampart scandal); Dorothy Pomerantz, Final Cost ofRampart: Si Billion?,
L.A. Bus. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at 1 (discussing that the Rampart scandal will end
up "costing from $400 million to nearly $1 billion, or more"); Todd S. Pur-
dum, Los Angeles Police Scandal May Soil Hundreds of Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1999, at A16 (discussing the grave effects of the Rampart scandal);
Mike Tharp, L.A. Blues: Dirty Cops and Mean Streets, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Mar. 13, 2000, at 20 (discussing various perceptions of the LAPD in the
Rampart area).
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be made in the future to prevent its recurrence. Given that others on
the panel were focusing on the role of prosecutors, defense lawyers,
the police, and the legislature, I concentrated my remarks on the re-
sponsibility of the judges.
The thrust of my remarks was that judges must accept some re-
sponsibility for the Rampart scandal and concentrate on ways to
change their practices to prevent future abuses. While I do not be-
lieve that judges intentionally assist perjury and misconduct, actions
or inaction from the Bench may have unintentionally led to the in-
justices that occurred.
When innocent people are convicted, everyone in the criminal
justice system must share the responsibility. From the public's per-
spective, judges of course played a role in the injustices that occurred
because they were the ones who ultimately pronounced judgment
over the Rampart victims and imposed lengthy sentences for crimes
the defendants did not commit.
-
Some members of the Bench reacted extremely defensively and
negatively to my comments at the Symposium. 3 Rather than ac-
cepting responsibility for the problems facing the criminal justice
system, judges asserted that their hands were tied and that reforms
rested with prosecutors, police, and defense lawyers.4 In essence,
they circled the wagons.
While I was not surprised by these judges' reactions, I was dis-
appointed. The purpose of this Article is to articulate in more detail
how judges contributed to the Rampart scandal, why they can make
changes consistent with their role in the adversarial system, and to
2. See Ted Rohrlich, Scandal Shows Why Innocent People Plead Guilty,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1999, at Al ("Criminal justice is administered so inex-
actly that courts regularly allow people to plead guilty while claiming they are
innocent.").
3. See, e.g., Judge William F. Fahey, Criticism of Court Was Misdirected,
METROPOLITAN NEws-ENTERPRISE, Oct. 5, 2000, at 7; Robert Greene, Fidler
Defends Judiciary Against Calls for Change Sparked by Rampart,
METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE, Sept. 15, 2000, at 1. Of course, I should
be careful to add that not all judges have reacted negatively. In fact, in private,
many judges were willing to admit that they too were concerned about the is-
sues raised by the Rampart scandal. However, the public response by vocal
members of the judiciary was decidedly negative.
4. See, e.g., Victor E. Chavez, Perspective on the LAPD Scandal: The
"Referees " Are Not to Blame for Rampart, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2000, at B7.
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address the detrimental effects of the defensive posture of the court.
To do this, Part I begins with a description of how judicial conduct
can contribute to the justice system's problems with dishonest police.
Part I then discusses general responsibilities of judges in our adver-
sarial system. Finally, Part III details how judges can help prevent
police abuses.
I write with the sincere hope that the court will engage in some
meaningful introspection and dialogue regarding the serious issues
raised by the Rampart scandal. In many ways, this Article should be
considered a work in progress. Just as the Rampart scandal is still
unfolding, so are my ideas as to how its problems can be resolved.
Under the time pressures of a symposium, it is impossible to antici-
pate all of the issues that should be addressed. In fact, even the
structure for this Article is based upon my reactions to the initial re-
ports regarding the Rampart scandal. However, this Article can
serve as a starting point for a discussion as to what changes can and
need to be made to prevent injustices in the future.
We have a unique opportunity to address long-festering ills in
our criminal justice system. If we do so, meaningful reforms can oc-
cur. If we fail to do so, then I fear we will be engaging in the "Legal
Code of Silence.'" 5 It is time to take a long, hard look at criminal
justice in Los Angeles.6 The credibility of everyone in the profession
depends upon it.
5. This apt phrase was used by my colleague Professor Samuel H. Pills-
bury in discussing the controversy over sealing settlement records from public
inspection. The public, however, may choose to extend this phrase to the gen-
eral failure of those in the criminal justice system to admit the severe problems
it faces.
6. One of the repeated criticisms of academic examination of court prac-
tices is that those who do not sit on the Bench cannot appreciate the pressures
and practices of those who do sit on the Bench. While there may be some va-
lidity to this comment, my remarks are not based upon a long-distance view
from the "Ivory Tower." Having practiced criminal law for many years, and as
an active and current member of the Bar, I have made it a point to listen to the
concerns of both those on the Bench and those who must appear before the
court. Sometimes, the perspective and independence of being an outsider can
be helpful in analyzing a problem. Cf Samuel H. Pillsbury, Police Abuse:
Outsiders May Be the Best Judges, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 2000, at MI (dis-
cussing the history of police abuse in Los Angeles and the current Rampart
scandal disappointing reformers).
January 2001]
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II. How JUDGES CONTRIBUTE TO POLICE MISCONDUCT
Assume, for a moment, that judges do not intentionally assist
police misconduct. Is it nonetheless possible that judges contribute
to police perjury and the framing of innocent defendants by their
everyday practices? Certainly, the answer must be yes. The proof of
this is the Rampart scandal itself.
Over 100 convictions have been overturned in Los Angeles be-
cause Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers framed inno-
cent persons, planted evidence, and committed perjury. Thousands
of other cases are still under review. Within this group of victims
are defendants who pled guilty to crimes they did not commit be-
cause they believed they faced insurmountable obstacles in asserting
their innocence. 8 It also includes defendants who exercised their
right to a jury trial only to be convicted and sentenced to maximum
terms because they failed to accept responsibility for actions they did
not commit. 9 Finally, the Rampart scandal includes defendants who
suffered both the injustice of conviction and serious bodily injury be-
cause of police action.' 0
Each of the victims of the Rampart scandal appeared before
members of the Bench, yet none of these Bench officers prevented
the injustice. Where was the breakdown in the justice system?
First, judges unwittingly participate in police perjury and mis-
conduct by not critically examining police credibility during pro-
ceedings before the court. Although nobody can expect judges to
have crystal balls that can tell them to a certainty when witnesses are
lying, judges appear to have been ignoring telltale signs that police
officers fabricate testimony to obtain convictions. Such signs in-
clude amazingly similar stories by officers regarding the conduct of
7. See Beth Shuster & Vincent J. Schodolski, Poor Morale Rife in LAPD,
Survey Finds, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, at A22.
8. See Rohrlich, supra note 2, at Al.
9. See id.
10. For example, Javier Francisco Ovando, at age nineteen, was shot by
police officers in the head and permanently paralyzed. The officers planted a
sawed-off .22 caliber rifle on him and claimed that Ovando had attacked them.
After a jury trial, Ovando was sentenced to twenty-three years in prison for as-
saulting the police officers, despite the fact that he had no criminal record. See




unrelated defendants, inconsistencies in police officer reports, dra-
matic recalls of memory by police officers, and the reluctance of of-
ficers to turn over notes or reports regarding their actions.'" One can
only assume that the officers who lied in the Rampart scandal felt
emboldened to do so because they knew they could get away with it.
The ordinary reaction by judges to this allegation is a blanket
statement that it is not the role of judges to decide credibility, but
rather the role of the jurors. As discussed in Part II, it is absolutely
the role of judges to make credibility findings throughout the crimi-
nal process. From motions to suppress to sentencing hearings,
judges are responsible for ascertaining credibility. Abrogation of this
responsibility could certainly lead to the misconduct that occurred in
the Rampart scandal.
Moreover, it is insufficient for judges to assert that they will
confront police perjury when there is overwhelming proof of it.
Given that studies have revealed that judges and prosecutors suspect
a significant rate of police perjury-perhaps as high as in twenty
percent of all casesl--judges need to act upon their suspicions that
police have testified untruthfully. The easy path is to do nothing and
hide behind the traditional conception of judges as neutral referees.
The harder but more valuable path is to probe the witness to deter-
mine the true facts of the case.'
A second way in which judges may have contributed unwit-
tingly to the Rampart scandal is by their handling of guilty pleas. It
has now become common practice for judges in California courts to
rely on prosecutors to inquire about or set forth the factual basis for
11. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and
What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1041-48 (1996) (discussing
the nature of police testilying and tell-tale indications that it occurs). See also
Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am ": Lying and the Omission of Excul-
patory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1993) (dis-
cussing defense strategy, police control over access to exculpatory evidence,
and the "double file" system).
12. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor:
An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV.
75, 107 (1992).
13. See Rohrlieh, supra note 2, at Al (reporting a case in which the court
rejected a defense motion to dismiss because counsel failed to ask a prelimi-
nary witness a key question, even though the judge herself, who had also ques-
tioned the witness, never made the same inquiry).
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guilty pleas. Judges rarely engage in probing questioning to deter-
mine whether a defendant is pleading guilty because he is actually
guilty, or whether the defendant is pleading guilty because he feels
there is no way to contest trumped-up charges and fears imposition
of the maximum sentence if he proceeds to trial.14
The truncated manner in which guilty pleas are handled is par-
ticularly a problem in California where the law allows a defendant to
plead guilty to related charges, even as he is asserting his innocence
to the formal charges against him. These so called "West" pleas,
named after a case authorizing them, 15 do not eliminate the need for
judges to examine the factual basis for a plea. In fact, they make it
more critical for the court to do so. The court in West authorized a
plea bargaining process that allows defendants to plead to uncharged,
but reasonably related crimes. It did not mandate that courts accept
pleas to a crime the defendant did not or may not have committed.
By requiring detailed factual bases, judges can help avoid the types
of problems revealed by the Rampart scandal, including situations in
which a defendant pleads guilty to any charge, whether or not it was
committed, in order to avoid being framed by the police for more se-
rious offenses.
Third, wittingly or not, judges provide the additional hammer
prosecutors and police officers need to coerce defendants to forego
trial and their right to challenge the evidence. When judges routinely
impose maximum sentences on those who go to trial, and much more
lenient sentences on those who do not, the message to defendants is
that there is a devastating cost to exercising their Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial.16
Fourth, judges often allow prosecutors to skirt their responsibil-
ity to turn over timely discovery so that there can be a full investiga-
tion that will provide evidence to challenge the police officer's alle-
gations. The Brady standard set forth by the Supreme Court, which
allows the disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment materials at
any time before the conclusion of trial, has been too low of a bar to
set for prosecutors' discovery compliance. By allowing prosecutors
14. See id
15. See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1970).
16. See Rohrlich, supra note 2, at Al.
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to delay discovery, judges have hampered defense counsel in their
duties to investigate prosecution witnesses and evidence.
Correspondingly, judges may be hampering defense efforts to
discover perjury and misconduct by routinely denying defense re-
quests for continuances of trials when there have been late disclo-
sures by the prosecution. While the law affords judges the discretion
to determine when a trial should be continued, judicial officers may
too often put the needs of the court's calendars ahead of the defense
interests in thoroughly investigating the case.
Fifth, the lack of diversity in judges on the Bench may be exas-
perating the aforementioned problems. 17 By diversity, I do not mean
only ethnicity or gender.' 8 Rather, the overemphasis on appointing
17. The California Bench has the largest judicial system in the world with
more than 1600 judges. Progress in diversifying the Bench is slowly being
made. Ten percent of Governor Jerry Brown's appointments to the Bench
were Black, 9% were Hispanic, and 4% were Asian. See Jean Guccione, Judge
Wilson: The Governor Will Be Remembered for a Deep Judicial Imprint, L.A.
DAILY J., Dec. 14, 1998, at Al. Governor George Deukmejian appointed 87%
Whites to the Bench, 3.4% Blacks, 5.1% Hispanics, and 3.2% Asians. See id;
see also Peter Allen, Deuknejian's Judicial Legacy: The Retiring Governor
Has Kept His Promise to Put a Conservative Cast on the State's Judicia, 11
CAL. LAW. 25 (1991) (discussing Deukmejian's selection of conservative
judges "in his own image"). Eighty-five percent of his appointments were
male; 15% were female. See Jean Guccione, The Judicial Legacy: Governor
Heavily Favored Ex-Prosecutors, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 7, 1991, at Al [herein-
after Guccione, The Judicial Legacy]. Of Governor Pete Wilson's early ap-
pointments, 88% were White, 6% were Black, and 6% were Hispanic. See
Jean Guccione, Gov. Wilson's Judges Have a Different Look, L.A. DAILY J.,
May 1, 1992, at Al. In total, former Governor Pete Wilson ended up appoint-
ing 344 judges. See Memorandum of California Judges Association on Statis-
tics for Judicial Appointments (Oct. 30, 2000) (on file with Loyola Law Re-
view). Of those, 73% were male and 27% were female. See id. So far,
Governor Gray Davis has appointed forty-nine judges. One-third of Governor
Davis' appointments have been women and only 13% come from prosecutorial
ranks. See id
18. One new way of thinking about judicial diversity may be to compare
the concept of "community policing" to "community judging." Some reform-
ers have maintained that selecting officers who have ties to various constituen-
cies in a community may help improve law enforcement. Although diversity
in departments, or even ties to a community, does not necessarily guarantee
better law enforcement officers or judges, it does enhance the credibility of
those working within the criminal justice system institutions. See Sarah E.
Waldeck Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to
Crime Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34
January 2001]
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former prosecutors has created a collection of judges whose natural
inclination is not to be skeptical of law enforcement's presentation.19
When a judge has spent years as a prosecutor with an adversarial
view toward defendants, it takes a particular conscientiousness to
remain free from ingrained biases.
Finally, there has been a failure by judges who have witnessed
police perjury to take meaningful action to prevent such misconduct
in the future. A judge's standard course of action when an officer
has lied is to dismiss the case or grant a motion to suppress, and ask
the prosecutors to report the misconduct to appropriate police inter-
nal affairs authorities. There is no follow-up by the court, no judicial
reporting of the misconduct, no contempt orders, and no tracking of
the problem officers. As a result, while a judge may occasionally
take an interest in a particular case, systemic problems with corrupt
police officers continue.
III. JUDGES' RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
The defensive reaction by the Bench to these accusations indi-
cates that the court has adopted an overly narrow and parochial view
of the role of a judge in our criminal justice system. Typical re-
sponses include: "It's not my job to decide credibility"; "If I call an
officer a liar then I can be recused as being a biased judge"; "I often
suspect there are problems with the officers' story, but the defense
cannot prove it to me"; "It is the defense lawyer's job to challenge
the prosecution's case, not mine"; or "I am the judge, not the jury.",
20
GA. L. REv. 1253, 1291-92 (2000).
19. See Jean Guccione, The Judicial Legacy, supra note 17 (stating that
65% of Governor Deukmejian's judicial appointments had prosecutorial back-
grounds; of the 604 prosecutors he appointed, 74% had worked in a district
attorney's office, 14% had worked for the attorney general, 13% had worked
for a city attorney, and 8% had worked as federal prosecutors); Jenifer Warren
& Daniel M. Weintraub, The Road to the Bench, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1988, at
B1 (criticizing governors for appointing primarily government prosecutors to
the Bench). Only seven percent of Governor Wilson's and Governor
Deukmejian's appointees had experience as public defenders. See Rohrlich,
supra note 2, at Al.
20. See Judith C. Chirlin, Trial by Jury: Judges Must Respect Juror's Role
as Ultimate Fact Finder, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 3, 2000, at 6 (arguing that credi-
bility determinations must generally be left to the jury, but recognizing that




In fact, a closer analysis proves that judges have far-reaching re-
sponsibilities in criminal proceedings, even in those that may eventu-
ally involve a jury trial. To understand where breakdowns can occur
in justice, it is important to examine all of the roles that judges serve
in our criminal justice system.
A. Credibility Determinations
A judge in our criminal justice system is more than a referee.2'
Depending on the proceeding before the court, the judge must per-
form a myriad of roles. Sometimes the judge must interpret the law
applicable to the case; sometimes the judge must determine what
evidence should be admitted; sometimes the judge must maintain
courtroom order; and sometimes, the judge must make key credibil-
ity determinations.
Consider, for example, the various proceedings in a criminal
case. Contrary to what several judges profess, it is the responsibility
of the court to make credibility calls in many of the proceedings over
which they preside. In fact, the trial is one of the rare situations
where, after making all the appropriate evidentiary rulings, the court
must defer to jury findings of credibility and weight of evidence.
Beginning with bail determinations, the judge must make a deci-
sion regarding the strength of prosecution allegations that a defen-
dant is a flight risk or danger to the community. Although courts
need not hold trial-like hearings in making these determinations, it is
within the judge's discretion to question witnesses before making a
final determination. Rarely do judges avail themselves of this op-
portunity.
21. As one letter to the editor in response to a judge's editorial stated:
I do not elect judges as referees in a sports contest. Rather, I expect
judges to uphold the law and see to it that justice prevails. But even if
one were to accept [the judge's] view regarding a judge's role, his
analogy is faulty. A referee's prime responsibility is to enforce the
rules and prevent cheating by either side. Lying by a witness and/or
falsifying evidence are against the rules; they are the worst kind of
cheating. A judge who turns a blind eye to police officers who lie and
falsify evidence and prosecutors who encourage or conduct such ille-
gal activities is no better than a referee who only calls fouls against
one team.
Robert L. Sachs, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2000, at B 10.
January 2001]
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In other pretrial stages of a case, the judge must also make key
credibility decisions. The most obvious of these are preliminary
hearings and motions to suppress. Under current Proposition 115
guidelines, prosecutors are entitled to present hearsay police testi-
mony at preliminary hearings.22 Judges must evaluate the testimony
of these officers to determine whether a defendant should be held for
trial. Given that there is no jury to evaluate the evidence, and judges
know that the officers may be relying on reports, it is critical that
judges be satisfied that the reports are accurate or require that live
witnesses be brought into court to testify.
Likewise, when evidence has been seized without a warrant, or
where the defendant contests the validity of a confession, judges are
often called upon to determine whether the police officer's testimony
is reliable enough to permit admission of the evidence. Judges tend
to evade this responsibility by not questioning an officer's testimony
unless the defense has demonstrated indisputably that the officer has
lied. Judges may also decline to make credibility decisions because
evidence, other than the officer's testimony, supports the prosecu-
tion's position. Judges can remain impartial decision-makers while
still probing the evidence to assure that it was not illegally obtained
or manufactured.
A judge does not become an advocate merely by asking ques-
tions. Even in a jury trial, the rules of court allow a judge to question
witnesses. 23 In fact, "[w]ithin reasonable limits, the court has a duty
to see that justice is done and to bring out facts relevant to the jury's
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West 2000); Whitman v. Superior
Court, 54 Cal. 3d 1063, 1072-73, 820 P.2d 262, 266, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160, 164-
65 (1991). See generally LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 10:22, at 400 (2000) (discussing the introduction of hearsay tes-
timony by a qualified officer into evidence). Many concerns have been raised
about the impact of Proposition 115 on the accuracy and fairness of prelimi-
nary hearings and plea bargaining. With the greater reliance on hearsay and
modifications in the discovery rules, there is certainly the increased possibility
that it will be more difficult for judges to detect inaccuracies, intentional or
otherwise, in police reports. See Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary
Hearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal Cases in California: Discovery Be-
fore andAfter Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 465, 508-15 (1998).
23. See People v. Camacho, 19 Cal. App. 4th 1737, 1744, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d
286, 290 (1994) ("The trial judge has a right to question witnesses.").
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determination. 24 Although a trial judge should not appear to take
sides in proceedings before the jury,25 the judge may properly ask
questions to clarify the testimony and seek the truth from wit-
nesses.
26
There are also hearings on motions in limine and evidentiary
rulings in which judges must make credibility determinations. Once
again, in these situations, judges should not feel uncomfortable en-
gaging in the type of inquiry needed to assure themselves not just
that the defense cannot prove perjury, but that, in fact, the prosecu-
tion's evidence is sound.
Even at sentencing and probation revocation hearings, judges
must make credibility determinations. Deferring to police officer
testimony is not a neutral stance. It is, in fact, placing a thumb on the
scale in favor of the prosecution.
The key to understanding why the power and responsibility to
make credibility determinations is an inherent part of the judge's role
is to consider how much discretion is built into our criminal justice
system. We do not arbitrarily limit a judge's exercise of discretion.
24. People v. Santana, 80 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 1206, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158,
166 (2000); see also AM. BAR ASs'N, AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE ch. 6, at 1 (1978) (stating that the
adversarial nature of trial proceedings do not relieve the trial judge of the obli-
gation of raising on his or her initiative, at all appropriate times, matters which
may significantly promote a just determination of the trial).
25. See, e.g., People v. Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4th 312, 353, 935 P.2d 708, 728,
63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 21 (1997) (stating that it is misconduct for a court to per-
sistently make "discourteous and disparaging remarks so as to discredit the de-
fense or create the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution").
26. See People v. Corrigan, 48 Cal. 2d 551, 559, 310 P.2d 953, 958 (1957);
People v. Melton, 206 Cal. App. 3d 580, 595, 253 Cal. Rptr. 661, 671 (1988);
People v. Alfaro, 61 Cal. App. 3d 414, 426-27, 132 Cal. Rptr. 356, 363-64
(1976).
27. The one notable exception to this rule is the recent movement to limit
judicial discretion at sentencing by imposing mandatory minimum sentences
and rigid sentencing schemes, such as the Three-Strikes Law. A complete dis-
cussion of this issue is beyond the purview of this paper. For more informa-
tion, see Debate, Mandatory Minimums in Drug Sentencing: A Valuable
Weapon in the War on Drugs or a Handcuff on Judicial Discretion?, 36 AM.
CRm. L. REV. 1279 (1999), and Ronald Weich, The Battle Against Mandator




Likewise, there are no systemic restrictions on how the judge can go
about making credibility determinations. In encouraging judges to
be more aggressive in their inquiries, I join Judge Learned Hand's
assessment of how to best allow a trial judge to achieve justice:
"With all his sins upon him, his self-importance, his ignorance, his
bad manners, his impatience, he is all you have got, and I believe he
will produce better results if you give him a little more room to roam
about."
28
B. Judges'Responsibilities at Guilty Pleas
Judges' responsibilities will also vary depending on whether
they are presiding over a jury trial or taking a guilty plea. The jury
trial is the most adversarial of our court proceedings and it thereby
requires the judge to function much more as a referee. However,
when judges preside over guilty pleas, they have special responsi-
bilities.29 They must determine whether a plea is knowing and vol-
untary.30 To do so, judges must make important inquiries and credi-
bility decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the following
when it adopted the rule that the voluntariness of a guilty plea must
be demonstrated on the record: "[A] plea of guilty is more than an
admission of conduct; it is a conviction. Ignorance, incomprehen-
sion, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be
a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality."
31
In California, the procedures for guilty pleas were set forth by
the California Supreme Court in In re Tahl.3 2 The focus of both
Boykin and Tahl was the express advisement and waiver of a defen-
dant's constitutional rights to a jury trial, confrontation and protec-
tion from self-incrimination. Thus, much of the caselaw focuses on
how explicit the court's explanation of those rights must be.
28. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 147
(1994).
29. See Randall Lockhart, Comment, The People of the State of Michigan
Versus Rex Reichenback-Separation of Powers or Judicial Activism?, 75 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 355, 367 (1998).
30. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240-41 (1969).
31. Id. at 242-43.
32. 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969).
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However, another critical aspect of a guilty plea is the require-
ment that there be a factual basis for the plea.33 In federal court, the
standard practice for judges is to elicit from the defendant "what he
or she did" in ascertaining whether the defendant actually committed
the crime to which he or she is pleading guilty.34  Alternatively,
judges may ask the prosecution to articulate a factual basis for the
plea and then ask the defendant to verify whether the prosecution's
information is accurate.
By contrast, judges in California often seek to meet the require-
ment of a factual basis for the plea merely by asking the defendant
on the record if he or she is pleading guilty because he or she is
guilty.35 Unless the defendant's guilty plea to a felony is conditioned
on receipt of a particular sentence or other exercise of the court's
power (i.e., negotiated pleas), California law does not require the
court to satisfy itself in any more detail than determining whether
there is a factual basis for the plea.36 This rule even applies in capital
cases.
37
Yet, if the courts were so inclined, there is no rule that would
bar California judges from conducting more detailed examinations of
the factual bases for all guilty and nolo contendere pleas. In fact, the
California Supreme Court, while declining to impose a specific rule
of criminal procedure, approved the practice of eliciting a detailed
33. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 2000).
34. See FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(f).
35. See 4 B.E. WrrKn & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAW § 2193 (Supp. 1999) (discussing that a stipulation by defense counsel and
prosecutor that a factual basis exists for the plea satisfies the requirement that
the court itself inquire about the factual basis) (citing People v. McGuire, 1
Cal. App. 4th 281, Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (1991)). Alternatively, some judges allow
the prosecutor to conduct this portion of the guilty plea procedure by asking
them to conduct the inquiry of the defendant
36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5; People v. Wilkerson, 6 Cal. App. 4th
1571, 1576, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 395 (1992) (noting that an independent in-
quiry that a factual basis exists is required under section 1192.5 for all negoti-
ated pleas, i.e., those pleas that result from plea bargaining); see also People v.
Hoffard, 10 Cal. 4th 1170, 1181-84, 899 P.2d 896, 902-04, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d
827, 833-35 (1995) (noting that the factual basis requirement used in federal
court is not a federal constitutional requirement but one established by federal
rules).
37. See People v. Fairbank, 16 Cal. 4th 1223, 1245-46, 947 P.2d 1321,
1333, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 796 (1997).
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factual basis for all pleas.38 Probing questions from the Bench may
reveal situations such as those that occurred in Rampart where
tainted and contrived evidence was used to pressure defendants to
plead guilty. "Conducting a factual basis inquiry before accepting or
entering judgment on a guilty plea may further important interests,
[including] ... protecting against the entry of a plea by an innocent
defendant ... ,,39 The only cost to the judge of conducting such an
inquiry is that it may consume more time and it may result in more
jury trials. Neither of these concerns are legitimate reasons for fore-
going a detailed examination.
In fact, not only may California judges follow their federal
counterparts in conducting more detailed questioning regarding the
factual basis for pleas, they have good reason and ability to do so.
Many of the state court appointees come from the ranks of state and
federal prosecutors' offices. 40  Others come from private criminal
practice or public defenders' offices. In each of these scenarios, the
judges would have had an opportunity to learn what kinds of pres-
sures can be imposed on a defendant to plead guilty and to admit a
factual basis, not because it is true, but simply to dispose of the case.
Judges would be well served to use their experiences to identify
cases where the defendant mouths the correct response for the plea,
but the actual facts of the case may not support it.
38. See Hoffard, 10 Cal. 4th at 1183-84, 899 P.2d at 904,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
835 ("In light of [a factual basis's] potential salutary effects, we approve of the
practice, which we understand many trial courts follow, of attempting to ensure
the existence of a factual basis for all guilty and no contest pleas."). In Hof-
fard, the California Supreme Court noted that "[a]lthough not constitutionally
compelled, a factual-basis inquiry may help to ensure the constitutional stan-
dards of voluntariness and intelligence are met." Id. at 1183 n.ll, 899 P.2d at
904 n.ll, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835 n.ll. The court wrote that "[a]scertaining the
existence of a factual basis assumes particular importance to the constitutional
standard when the defendant's plea of guilty is coupled with a contradictory
claim of innocence." Id. Of course, that is exactly the situation that developed
in many of the cases involved in the Rampart scandal. See discussion of Peo-
ple v. Munoz infra at Part IV.D.
39. Hoffard, 10 Cal. 4th at 1183, 899 P.2d at 904, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
40. See Harriet Chiang, Davis' Chance to Mold State Judiciary, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 30, 1998, at Al. The great influx of prosecutors began with
Governor George Deukmejian and continued through the administration of
Governor Pete Wilson. See id.
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Conducting a probing inquiry during the guilty plea does not
make the judge an advocate in the case. The judge remains the neu-
tral decision-maker, but is in a better position to fulfill his constitu-
tional obligation to ensure the plea is voluntary. Judges should not
delegate this responsibility to prosecutors or defense lawyers. There
are different pressures on counsel to ensure that a guilty plea is ac-
cepted. The only pressure on the judge should be from the U.S. Con-
stitution-the requirement that the plea be knowing and voluntary.
C. Judges'Responsibilities to Prevent Injustice
Judges ordinarily think of "justice" one case at a time. In other
words, the goal of a judge is to fairly adjudge the individual case be-
fore him or her at the time, without consideration of its impact on
other matters that may or may not appear before the court in subse-
quent, unrelated cases. With this goal in mind, judges may com-
fortably dismiss a case because of police misconduct or perjury, but
they do not feel a responsibility to take further action to penalize that
officer for misconduct. At most, some judges will ask the prosecutor
to follow up on reporting the police officer's misconduct and seek
some penalty for it.
It may be time, however, for judges to share broader responsi-
bility for justice. Judges have the power, through contempt citations
and reporting of misconduct, to take more aggressive steps to prevent
police misconduct. The Code of Judicial Ethics alludes to this re-
sponsibility when it states, "[a] judge ... shall act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and imparti-
ality of the judiciary." 41 Ethical codes also impose on judges the
obligation to report misconduct by other judges or those appearing
before the court.42 One of the reasons that judges have these respon-
sibilities is that they are responsible for justice beyond their own
docket sheets. Certainly after the Rampart scandal, judges cannot be
complacent in assuming that some other institution-prosecutors,
police, defense counsel-will take the appropriate steps to curtail
perjury and misconduct in the courts.
41. CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2A (2000).
42. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D(l), (2) (2000).
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Judicial passivity, while typical in our adversary system,43 is not
necessarily the equivalent of judicial impartiality. For those who
seek to circumvent the truth, judicial passivity allows them to rely on
a judge's reluctance to curb perjury or misconduct as an opportunity
to succeed in their deception. When a judge remains passive to such
efforts, misconduct is, in effect, encouraged."
A judge's efforts to prevent injustice may range from exerting
extra control over the parties and witnesses in a case4 5 to reporting
misconduct. There is nothing improper if the court takes reasonable
steps to ensure that the truth will prevail in the individual case before
the court and that any efforts by parties or witnesses to mislead the
court will not be repeated in future cases.
D. Judges as Leaders
Although the suggestion now makes some judges uncomfort-
able, traditionally it has been an important role of the judiciary to
serve as leaders of our society. As far back as Biblical times, judges
were both the moral and legal leaders of entire nations. From Moses
to Deborah to King Solomon, the Bible is replete with examples of
judges both deciding difficult cases and serving as moral guides for
society.46 These ancient heroes led their nations in war and peace.
43. See FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR
TRIAL REFORM 15 (1994) (arguing that judicial passivity is a style embraced
by most American trial judges because they want to distance themselves from
unpopular decisions and are concerned about the political repercussions of be-
ing reversed on appeal).
44. It is certainly not axiomatic that judges must remain passive in order to
preside over a case impartially. Even within the American adversary system,
decision makers often play an active role without losing their impartiality.
Consider, for example, arbitrators or certain types of mediators. They play
very active roles in questioning witnesses and seeking out the truth without
sacrificing their impartiality. "Clearly, impartiality and passivity are not nec-
essarily corollaries." Id. at 84.
45. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (finding that trial
judges may properly restrain lawyers from coaching witnesses as long as the
court's sequestration order does not violate the defendants' right to assistance
of counsel).
46. See ADN STEINSALTZ, BIBLICAL IMAGES: MEN AND WOMEN OF THE
BOOK 99-105, 153-67 (1984). Interestingly, the Bible also discusses a system
of judiciary that is not unilateral governance by a single judge. Rather, Moses
himself delegated his judicial powers to appointed "chiefs of thousands, hun-
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The law and moral beliefs were their guides. Even the traditional
qualifications for judges reflected the broader role they served in so-
ciety. The great philosopher Maimonides included among the fun-
damental qualities of a judge wisdom, humility, disdain of money,
love of truth, love of people, and a good reputation. "[A judge] must
be wise and sensible, learned in the law and full of knowledge
"-47
Today, we no longer expect our judges to don suits of armor and
ride the countryside pursuing justice. However, we do expect them
to be on the frontline in identifying and redressing problems in the
justice system. There is a reason that codes of judicial ethics specifi-
cally authorize judges to "speak, write, lecture, teach and participate
in other extra-judicial activities concerning the law, legal system
[and] the administration of justice. . . .,48 Judicial officers are pre-
sumed to have a "unique position to contribute to the improvement
of the law, the legal system, and the administration of'justice .... 49
Judges from across the political spectrum have recognized this
important responsibility of the Bench. From Chief Justice Earl War-
ren's emphasis on "the positive qualities of public service, and the
need for 'a new commitment to the rights of man,"' 50 to Associate
Justice Louis Brandeis's commitment to Greek ideals of public
service, 51 to Chief Justice William Rehnquist's call for reforms in the
judicial system, 52 judges have not limited their responsibilities to
dreds, fifties and tens," and the early judicature developed laws by establishing
judicial precedents. See MENACHEM ELON, THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW
562 (1974).
47. ELON, supra note 46, at 563. Maimonides also included "fear of God"
in his list of attributes. See id. In a secular system of'justice, such a require-
ment would of course be unconstitutional. However, a judge's understanding
of the consequences of his or her acts is still reflected in the criteria currently
employed to select judges.
48. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B (2000).
49. Id. at Canon 4 cmt
50. G. EDWARD WIRTE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 324 (1982).
51. See PHILIPPA STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE
238 (1984).
52. Chief Justice Rehnquist regularly addresses the American Bar Associa-
tion regarding a wide variety of issues, ranging from the death penalty to the
scope of federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Paul Marcotte, Rehnquist: Cut Juris-
diction: ChiefJustice Outlines Reform Proposals in ABA Speech, 75 A.B.A. J.
22 (1989); W. John Moore, Death Roiv Delays, 21 NAT'L L.J. 768 (1989) (re-
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resolving only the disputes before them. They have strived to look at
the bigger picture and institute reforms that may assist the system in
general.
Today, many judges appear to be locked in a box. While they
devotedly decide the cases presented to them, too many are reluctant
to voyage into the world of reforms. Part of the reason for this may
be the enormous demands on judges' time. I fear, however, that part
of the reason may be that judges no longer perceive themselves as
leaders of the community.
Consistent with the role of leadership is the responsibility to
identify and address persistent problems in the justice system. Al-
though there is no way to know for sure, it is unlikely that the entire
Bench had no inkling that police officers were slanting their testi-
mony or not being completely candid with the court and prosecutors
regarding the investigations they conducted. Affirmative efforts by
the court to have court committees address such concerns, especially
those that interact with the Bar, could be helpful in preventing the
spread of abusive practices.
With a greater appreciation for the wide range of their responsi-
bilities, judges may feel more comfortable taking those steps that
could prevent a recurrence of the Rampart scandal. These steps will
not change judges from impartial decision-makers to advocates or
accusers. They will, however, provide a safety check in a system
where the imbalance in strength of the adversaries no longer provides
an adequate safeguard.53
counting speeches by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. on the issue of reforming appellate procedures in death penalty
cases); All Things Considered! Rehnquist Against Making Crimes Federal
(Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Feb. 4, 1992). The Justices have no hesitancy in
meeting with groups throughout the country to address issues that they believe
affect public trust and confidence in the justice system. See Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Cuomo to Address Trust, Confidence in Justice System, U.S.
NEwsWIRE, May 12, 1999.
53. The enactment of the California Three-Strikes Law has changed dra-
matically the relative bargaining power of prosecutors and defense counsel in
plea negotiations. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999). The law pro-
vides for a life sentence for a third-time offender, even if the third strike is not
for a violent offense. See Greg Krikorian, Repeat Offender Law Strikes Activ-
ists as Exceedingly Unjust, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1999, at B1. Thus, if a de-
fendant with a prior record wants to contest even a relatively minor offense, he
or she risks a severe sentence by opting for a trial. See ABC News: Nightline
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IV. SEIZING THE OPPoRTUNrEs: How JUDGES CAN HELP
PREVENT POLICE ABUSES
In his report, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky made several rec-
ommendations as to how the judiciary can help prevent future police
abuses, such as those that occurred in the Rampart scandal. 54 These
recommendations ranged from increasing judicial independence to
instituting a mandatory reporting requirement for police perjury.
Each of Professor Chemerinsky's recommendations deserves serious
consideration. Some members of the Bench have already expressed
their skepticism and rejected these recommendations, perhaps based
upon an incomplete or mistaken understanding of the actual pro-
posal. However, it serves all of us to carefully analyze each pro-
posal. Certainly, maintaining the same course is unlikely to help. If
the Rampart scandal has taught society anything, it is that there must
be a critical reexamination of all aspects of our criminal justice sys-
tem.
A. Recommendation #3055: Istitute a Judicial
Reporting Requirement
The primary recommendation in the Chemerinsky Report is that
the legislature or judicial ethical rules require judges to report find-
ings by the court of police perjury or false statements. The Report
(ABC television broadcast, May 12, 2000); see also Samuel Pillsbury. Per-
spective on Justice: Even the Innocent Can be Coerced into Pleading Guily,
L.A. TiMES, Nov. 28, 1999, at M5 (discussing the "shameful legacy" of plea
bargaining).
54. See Erwin Chemeriusky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles
Police Department's Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 40
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 545 (2001) (I have hereinafter referred to this as the
"Chemerinsky Report."). I was proud to assist Professor Chemerinsk3, as a
"collaborator" on his Report. While I agree with an overwhelming number of
his suggestions, I have not joined in all of his final recommendations.
55. My discussion begins with Recommendation #30 because this was the
first recommendation of the Chemerinsky Report that related to the responsi-
bilities of the judiciary. In discussing the Report's recommendations, I have
chosen to discuss them sequentially. Although I have done so, the result has
been that some of the most important recommendations, like encouraging
judges to insist on a complete factual basis for guilty pleas, are not discussed
until later in this Article. The order in which I discuss the recommendations
should not be read as a ranking of their importance.
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recommends that this requirement be mandatory so that judges will
not fear political reprisal by police supporters.
Reporting requirements for judges are not new. Canon 3(D)(1)
of the California Code of Judicial Ethics already requires judges to
report ethical violations by other judges.5 6 Similarly, Canon 3(D)(2)
requires that "[w]henever a judge has personal knowledge that a
lawyer has violated any provision of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, the judge shall take appropriate corrective action." 7 The Advi-
sory Committee Commentary further explains that "appropriate cor-
rective action" includes reporting the violation to the presiding judge
or bar authority responsible for disciplinary action.58
Under current state law, judges must report to the State Bar if a
lawyer suffers a discovery sanction of more than $100059 or improp-
erly threatens criminal charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dis-
pute.60 If a lawyer violates the rules against pretrial publicity, 61 the
court must also take corrective action. Even if a judge has personal
knowledge of illegal advertising or client solicitation,62 the judge has
a duty to report the misconduct. All these situations are important,
but they pale in comparison with the need to take action to prevent
and punish police perjury and misconduct.
It is consistent with the judge's role in making credibility find-
ings and ensuring the integrity of the courtroom to require reporting
perjury to an administrative authority that could conduct the appro-
priate follow-up to ensure that the officer is appropriately disciplined
and monitored in future cases. Other than through courtroom gossip,
judges do not have the ability to alert other judges to the problem
with particular police witnesses. They also do not have the ability to
take steps to correct a police officer's inappropriate behavior.
Alerting the appropriate administrative agency to the officer's mis-
conduct will give those in the best situation to remedy the problem
the notice and opportunity to do so.
56. See CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHics Canon 3(D)(1) (1999).
57. Id. at Canon 3(D)(2).
58. See id. at Canon 3(D) cmt.
59. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West 2000).
60. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 5-100(A) (West 2000).
61. See id. at 5-120.
62. See id. at 1-400.
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In rejecting this proposal, one judge voiced the concern that
judges would be asked to be harsher in their evaluation of police of-
ficers' testimony than that of other witnesses. Professor Chemerin-
sky's recommendation makes no such suggestion. It does not call for
additional findings of police perjury by the court. It does not assume
that judges will always know when such misconduct has occurred. It
does not require that judges assume police officers are lying.
63
What the proposal does, however, is provide an avenue by
which judges can be assured that their concerns about police miscon-
duct and perjury will be addressed. Rather than rely on prosecutors,
who often ally themselves with the police, to take corrective action,
the court can alert an authority charged with that specific responsi-
bility. Given that court records are already public, sharing a court's
findings with another institution would not seem to be particularly
problematic.
Judges may be concerned, however, about the mandatory nature
of the proposed reporting requirements. There are reasons for and
against making the requirement mandatory. One strong reason for
making the requirement mandatory is that a mandatory requirement
will provide some protection for judges who may fear political re-
taliation for their decisions. Rather than judges being blamed for
using their discretion to report problem officers, the judges can stand
on their ethical duty to report.
The issue of judicial independence is not an easy one to discuss
with the court. Some judges deny that there is political pressure on
judges when they make decisions. 64 History shows otherwise. For
63. In fact, one of the risks of this recommendation is that judges will be
even more reluctant to find police perjury and misconduct because they vil be
reluctant to involve themselves in the reporting requirements. This is a diffi-
cult issue. If the standard is lowered for reporting, some officers' credibility
could be judged unfairly. On the other hand, with the current high standard, it
is far too easy for judges and prosecutors to ignore police misrepresentations. I
hope to discuss in a future paper the proper standard of proof for judges to use
in evaluating whether there has been intentional police misrepresentations and
misconduct.
64. See Robert Greene, Fidler Defends Judiciary Against Calls for Change
Sparked by Rampart, METROPOLrrAN NEWs-ENTERPRISE, Sept 15, 2000, at 1.
Greene reported that Judge Fidler dismissed as "absolute nonsense" the asser-
tion that political pressures prevent judges from adequately scrutinizing and
reporting questionable testimony by police officers in criminal cases. Judge
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example, in 1970, Los Angeles voters ousted Judge Alfred Gitelson
because of his decision to enforce busing laws.6 More recently,
judges such as Joyce Karlin have had to face tough and expensive
judicial races when their seats have been challenged. 6 Untenured
judges often face some level of political pressure, whether it be from
organized citizen groups, police unions, or prosecutors.67  While
Fidler further alleged that judges do not even talk among themselves about
possible political pressure placed on the judiciary. See id
65. For a full account of the attack on Judge Gitelson for his ruling in the
Los Angeles school busing case, see JOHN CAUGHEY, To KILL A CHILD'S
SPIRIT: THE TRAGEDY OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN Los ANGELES 156-65
(1973).
66. Given the high cost of successfully defending a judicial seat, there is a
significant risk that just the cost of running for judicial office may deter some
judges from making controversial rulings. See Sheryl Stolberg, Politics and
the Judiciary Coexist, But Often Uneasily, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1992, at Al.
The cost to a judicial candidate of including a statement in the voter pamphlet
can exceed $45,000. See Jim Newton, Efforts to Alter Judge Elections Is Dis-
missed, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1996, at BI. A study by the "California Com-
mission on the Courts found that the cost of the average superior court race in
the Los Angeles area more than doubled every year, increasing twenty-two
fold from 1976 to 1994." Sheila Kaplan, The Buying of the Bench, NATION,
Jan. 26, 1998, at 11. Median spending for a contested election to the Los An-
geles County Superior Court rose "from $3,177 in 1970 to $70,000 in 1994."
Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 68, 69; see also
Lorenza Munoz, Judicial Campaign Costs Soar, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995, at
BI (discussing that a candidate's average expenditure has climbed to $70,000).
More specifically, when Superior Court Judge Joyce Karlin was chal-
lenged in 1992 because of her controversial ruling in the Latasha Harlins/Soon
Ja Du case, she was forced to expend $43,707.87 for the services of a political
campaign consultant. See Keith Donoghue, The Judge Maker; Power Broker
Joseph Cerrell, Jr. Wrote the Book on Judicial Race, AM. LAW., May 28,
1996, at 1; see also Miguel Bustillo, Foes of Judge Karlin Short of Signatures,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at A9 (discussing failure of second effort to recall
Judge Karlin). Notably, she was the only one of the Superior Court's eighty-
two judges challenged in that election. See Elka Womer, L.A. Judicial Race
Being Closely Watched, UPI, May 31, 1992. For more information regarding
the Latasha Harlins/Soon Ja Du case, see Wanda Coleman, Blacks, Immigrants
and America: Remembering Latasha, NATION, Feb. 15, 1993, at 187.
67. Moreover, even judges with life tenure can face enormous political
pressure for their rulings against law enforcement. In one particularly striking
case, Judge Harold Baer, Jr. of the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York suppressed police evidence on a narcotics charge be-
cause he did not believe the police testimony establishing probable cause. See
United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In harshly
worded dicta, Judge Baer criticized the police officers' conduct and, citing to
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some judges feel secure in their ability to withstand such pressures,
others may not. A mandatory reporting requirement can provide
some protection for those judges who might otherwise be marked as
"anti-law enforcement."
Another concern that could be raised about a mandatory report-
ing requirement is the problem with shifting disciplinary focus away
from the officers who lied and onto the judges who may fail to report
the perjury. There is the possibility that a judge would be deterred
from making the finding of perjury because the reporting require-
ment is only triggered upon such a finding. While this is a legitimate
concern, a reporting requirement might actually have the extra bene-
fit of requiring courts to focus on the question of intentional decep-
tion. No one wants judges to cavalierly accuse police officers of se-
rious misconduct like perjury. Because the reporting requirement
only applies in those extreme situations where the police have been
found to lie or plant evidence, there should be the highest scrutiny by
judges before making this decision. In those situations where there is
a mere suggestion of misconduct but insufficient proof;6 s judges
the Mollen Commission's Report on police misconduct in New York, sug-
gested that defendants were right in believing that police in their neighborhood
were abusive and violent. See id. The media attacked his ruling and over 100
members of Congress threatened to impeach him. See Morgan Cloud, People
v. Simpson: Perspectives on the Implications for the Criminal Justice System:
Judges, "Testilying, " and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1347-50
(1996); Andrew J. McClung, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Disso-
nance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 406-12
(1999). Thereafter, Judge Baer agreed to hold a second evidentiary hearing
with new testimony from other officers. He reversed his original decision and
formally apologized to the police. See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp.
211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Mark Hamblett, Second Circuit Vindicates Baer in Drug
Case, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 20, 2000, at 1.
68. In general, the defendant bears the burden in a suppression hearing to
demonstrate that the government's evidence was unlawfully obtained and
therefore should be suppressed. See United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985,
989 (2d Cir. 1980). The defendant must present a prima facie case of a con-
stitutional violation. See id. Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to
the government to justify its intrusion on the defendant's rights. See United
States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 1973). Thus, at least when the gov-
ernment has acted without a warrant, the ultimate burden is upon the govern-
ment to show that its evidence is not tainted. See Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969). Unlike in other criminal proceedings, the standard
of proof in suppression hearings is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but a
preponderance of the evidence standard. See United States v. Matlock, 415
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would have the discretion to ask prosecutors to follow up on the
matter, voluntarily report the issue to appropriate authorities, or sim-
ply factor their suspicions into the rulings in the case.
As Judge Susan Ehrlich of the Arizona Court of Appeals dis-
cussed during the Loyola Rampart Symposium, other jurisdictions
already have reporting procedures for their judges.6 9 Likewise, they
are not reluctant to insist to counsel and a witness that the officer tell
the truth. An Arizona judge who observes police perjury may report
it for perjury prosecution without disqualifying her entire court as
somehow biased. Although that judge should obviously not preside
over the perjury prosecution because he or she was a percipient wit-
ness to the lies, another judge of the same court is not similarly dis-
qualified.70
Given the scope of the problem with police perjury and miscon-
duct in Los Angeles, it is time to consider changes in how judges
handle such matters. Judges no longer have the luxury to assume
that someone else, such as the prosecutor, will follow through with
investigations of police perjury and misconduct. A mandatory re-
porting requirement, while not perfect, is one such option. At mini-
mum, it would steer judges from the course of least resistance, i.e.,
ignoring the police misconduct and hoping that others in the future
will not be fooled by the officer's misrepresentations.
B. Recommendation #30A: Using Contempt of Court to Combat
Perjury or False Statements
Professor Chemerinsky also suggests that judges can, in extreme
cases, use their contempt powers to punish officers who make inten-
tional misrepresentations to the court. There were two bases for that
suggestion. First, a California appellate court in People v. Trter7'
expressly acknowledged the power of judges to use their contempt
powers to punish perjury. 72 Second, in courts outside California,
U.S. 164, 177-78 n.14 (1974) (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-89
(1972)). Thus, the government may prove that evidence is admissible as long
as most of its evidence is credible, even though the testimony of some of its
officers may be somewhat suspicious.
69. See Greene, supra note 64, at 4.
70. See id
71. 168 Cal. App. 3d 437, 443, 214 Cal. Rptr. 869, 872-73 (1985).
72. See id. at 442-43, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73. Indeed, one of the reasons
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such as those in Arizona, judges have been active in using contempt
as a way to deter and punish perjury.
It was no surprise that some judges immediately reacted nega-
tively to this proposal.73 Because of the procedural difficulties in is-
suing an effective contempt order, judges are generally reluctant to
use their contempt powers. For example, in a recent case, a superior
court judge held a lawyer in contempt for "yelling at the judge in
front of the jury in a loud, rude, hostile and disrespectful tone of
voice."74 Even though the judge had warned counsel and the con-
temptuous acts were committed in the court's presence, the court's
contempt order was reversed because it did not specifically state that
the petitioner was warned that the tone of voice he was using was
objectionable. 75 Thus, the technical procedural requirements for im-
posing contempt may make it a less feasible tool for dealing with
witness misconduct or perjury.
Nonetheless, contempt is a lawful sanction for judges to use
when witnesses, including police officers, affront the dignity of the
courtroom by lying to the judge or presenting false evidence.76 In
the Truer court held that contempt is a remedy for police perjury is that it will
decrease the pressure on courts to use the exclusionary rule to punish police
misconduct. If contempt is eliminated as an option by the courts, as well as
application of the exclusionary rule, there is even less disincentive for officers
to lie. See id; see also People v. Barry, 153 Cal. App. 2d 193, 200, 314 P.2d
531, 535 (1957) (discussing that even if a defendant can be prosecuted civilly
or criminally for perjury, contempt sanctions may still apply).
73. See Greene, supra note 64, at 1.
74. Boysaw v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 4th 215, 217, 999 P.2d 748, 750, 96
Cal. Rptr. 2d 531, 532-33 (2000) (emphasis omitted).
75. See id. at 223,999 P.2d at 753, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536.
76. There is relatively little case law in California regarding the applicabil-
ity of the contempt laws to perjury by a witness. However, in other states that
have used contempt laws in this manner, courts have emphasized that strict
standards apply. As noted by one court, "to punish perjury in the presence of
the court as a contempt, there must be added to the essential elements of per-
jury, under the general law, the further element of obstruction to the court in
the performance of its duty." Hicks v. Stigler, 323 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1982) (quoting People v. Koniecki, 171 N.E.2d 666, 668-69 (I. App. Ct.
1961)); see also Emanuel v. State, 601 So. 2d 1273, 1274-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (expressing that the preferred procedure for dealing with lying wit-
nesses is a separate perjury charge, not contempt). The strongest case for im-
posing contempt is where the falsity of the witness's testimony to the court is
proven by the contemnor's own contradictory statements to the court. See
People v. LaRosa, 556 N.E.2d 611, 612-13 (11. App. Ct. 1990).
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fact, contempt has many advantages over other sanctions. Its effects
are felt immediately, the judge has control over the sanctions that are
imposed, there will be a clear record of the offending officer's be-
havior, the media is more likely to report the misconduct, the con-
tempt sanction can be used to impeach the officer's credibility in the
future, and the sanction serves as a strong deterrent to others in-
volved in the case.
Moreover, contrary to the suggestion of one judge during the
Symposium, issuing a contempt sanction does not impede that par-
ticular judge's ability, or that of others in the same court, to decide
future cases involving law enforcement. There is no rule that re-
quires the court to recuse itself because it has held a witness in con-
tempt. Such a rule would be highly counterproductive. It would, in
essence, send a signal to violators that one way to avoid the height-
ened standards of a court is simply to act in a contumacious manner.
Each witness and each case must be evaluated individually.
Therefore, a prior ruling that a witness has lied need not disqualify
the court from hearing other matters involving other police officers.
While contempt may be viewed as an extreme measure in deal-
ing with witness credibility issues, the problem with police perjury
and fabrication of evidence is a severe enough problem to call for
strong measures. Judges should not automatically discount this al-
ternative merely because the Bench has not previously employed it.
C. Recommendation #31: Limit Peremptory Challenges of Judges
Because of the concern with judicial independence, Professor
Chemerinsky recommends limiting the ability of the District Attor-
ney's Office to strike judges from cases through their peremptory
challenges under section 170.6 of the California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure.77 This provision permits both the defense and prosecution to
file an affidavit to move to disqualify a judge that they believe would
not be impartial. While either side has the opportunity to file such an
affidavit in any individual case, in the long term, the power of the af-
fidavit works to the benefit of prosecutors. By repeatedly filing affi-
davits against a judge and disqualifying him or her from criminal
proceedings, prosecutors can effectively freeze that judge from
77. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West 2000).
[34:787
JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY
working on criminal cases. The result is often the judge's reassign-
ment to another court.
78
By contrast, defense counsel typically exercise less clout over
judges because they are not as frequently in the same courtroom.
The exercise of an individual affidavit by one defense lawyer against
a judge is unlikely to result in the reassignment of that judicial offi-
cer. Moreover, defense counsel must worry about which judge the
case will be reassigned to when the affidavit is filed.79
Professor Chemerinsky has identified an important concern cre-
ated by prosecutors' unlimited use of peremptory challenges against
a single judge, albeit in different cases. He proposes limiting the
ability of the District Attorney's Office to use its ability to exclude a
judge in criminal cases. However, there are several reasons this pro-
posal is problematic.
First, there are often valid reasons for prosecutors to exercise
peremptory challenges, and the public would be ill-served by arbi-
trarily barring them from doing so. Consider, for example, a judge
who was a former police officer and still maintains strong ties with
law enforcement. It would not be unreasonable for prosecutors to
want to avoid that judge when prosecuting law enforcement officers
for police corruption and misconduct. Ironically, by limiting the
number of times prosecutors could challenge a judge, this new pro-
posal would make it more difficult to criminally prosecute culpable
police officers.
Second, the proposal does not suggest how many challenges,
over what time period, would satisfy both prosecutors' interests in
securing a fair judge and yet not undercut the defense power to ob-
tain the same. Clearly, any number would be arbitrary. It would,
78. As stated in one recent article, "j]udges are in a pickle." Rohrlich, sit-
pra note 2, at Al. "If you called the police liars, they'd 'paper' you ....
[Then,] instead of working on a nice assignment near your home, they-your
fellow judges-send you downtown or to juvenile or dependency court, where
they send the slugs." Id.
79. Given that the reassignment of cases is not random, Public Defender
offices are reluctant to use their blanket affidavit power because they fear be-
ing assigned to an even less sympathetic court. As a result, it appears that
judges are generally more concerned about affidavits from the prosecutor's of-
fices, than those from defense counsel. See id
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therefore, arbitrarily allow some cases to be tried before a judge who
is perceived as biased and others to be spared.
Third, the proposal assumes that prosecutors could not otherwise
put pressure on judges, even absent their affidavit power. Under the
current structure of the courts, presiding and supervising judges as-
sign judges to their courts. The presiding judge can take a "wait and
see" approach to some judges because they know that the parties
themselves retain the affidavit power to disqualify the judge. If their
affidavit power is limited, prosecutors may be encouraged to lobby
more vociferously for or against the assignment of a particular judge
to their courthouse because the prosecutors will not be in a position
to evaluate the judge's impartiality on a case-by-case basis.
In general, I support the independence of judges. Accordingly, I
am not a strong supporter of the affidavit system. I would strongly
prefer that California courts adopt the federal model by which a
judge cannot be removed from a case unless there is a showing of
actual bias.80 However, I am not convinced that even the pressing
need to address police corruption makes arbitrarily changing the
number of times prosecutors can use their affidavit power a prudent
and effective move.
D. Recommendation #32: Judges Must Take Seriously Their
Responsibility for Ensuring that there is a True,
Factual Basis for a Guilty Plea
Perhaps the single most important proposal offered by Professor
Chemerinsky is that California judges take seriously their responsi-
bility for ensuring true, factual bases for guilty pleas entered before
them. This proposal is also the easiest to institute. One of the cases
under review in the Ramart scandal serves as a prime illustration of
the need for this reform.'
80. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (2000). Under § 144, a party must file a
timely recusal motion accompanied by an affidavit that states facts establishing
the challenged judge's personal prejudice against the party. See id. § 144.
Unlike the California system, recusal of the judge is not automatic. Rather, the
issue is evaluated by that judge to determine whether it should be referred to
another judge for a decision on its merits. See id. Section 455 allows for sua
sponte recusal when the impartiality of the judge may be reasonably ques-
tioned. See id. § 455.
81. See People v. Munoz, No. BA 135359 (Super. Ct. for the County of
[34:787
JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Raul Alfredo Munoz and Danny Banuelos were charged with
assault upon a peace officer. 82 In 1996, LAPD Officer Michael Bu-
chanan charged that Munoz, a member of a local gang, struck him
with his truck as he was engaged in a gang sweep. According to Bu-
chanan, the truck was traveling about twenty-five miles per hour
down an alley when he was hit on his left knee, causing him to roll
over and strike his head. The truck then headed for his partner, Offi-
cer Brian Liddy, who had to sidestep to avoid being hit by the open
passenger door.
After the preliminary hearing, both Munoz and Banuelos agreed
to plead guilty, pursuant to a plea offer from the Los Angeles District
Attorney's Office. The defendants were offered three years of pro-
bation, with no more than 365 days in county jail in exchange for
their pleas.
At his guilty plea, Munoz was advised of the charge to which he
was pleading guilty, asked if his plea was voluntary, advised of his
constitutional rights, and advised of the consequences of his plea.83
Neither he nor his codefendant were ever asked to state a factual ba-
sis for their plea. In fact, the only mention of a factual basis during
the entire plea colloquy were the following remarks by the judge:
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Okay. Then, gentle-
men, let me start with Mr. Munoz, Sir. Sir, to the charge in
count 2 that you violated Penal Code Section 245(c), assault
on a peace officer, how do you plead to that charge, sir?
DEFENDANT MUNOZ: Guilty.
THE COURT: And to the allegation that in the commission
of that offense, you personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon, a motor vehicle, do you admit or deny
that allegation?
DEFENDANT MUNOZ: I admit.
THE COURT: Counsel, you join in the waivers, concur in
the plea and stipulate to a factual basis?
L.A. Dec. 17, 1996) (on file with court).
82. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(c) (West 2000).
83. See Transcript of Plea at 4-11, People v. Munoz, No. BA 135359 (Su-
per. Ct. for the County of L.A. Dec. 17, 1996) (on file with author).
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MR. POWELL:84 Yes, Your Honor.
At no time during the plea were the defendants asked to describe
their encounter with the police or asked whether the officers' state-
ments at the preliminary hearing were accurate. The court assumed,
without probing, that the defendant was pleading guilty because he
had committed the offense, and not for any other reason.
As it turns out, there was another reason Munoz was pleading
guilty. He pled guilty because he felt he had no choice. Before his
sentencing, Munoz sought to withdraw his guilty plea. His lawyer
made the following comments to the court before sentencing:
MR. POWELL: Well, your Honor, before we [sentence],
when we were here the last time, the defendant wanted to
withdraw his plea, and we put it over to this day so I may
talk to him about it. And the reason that Mr. Munoz wants
to withdraw his plea, and I am making a motion at this
point in time, is that, first of all, he feels as though he is
factually innocent. That we have information-and this is
his position, that we have information that the officer testi-
fied at the prelim and lied about the police's opposition
about breaking the windshield, because we have informa-
tion-we have a fix it ticket that shows the window was
broke about two weeks before this incident.
So he feels, for that reason, that the officer lied about that;
that he feels as though-and it has always been his conten-
tion that he has been innocent all along; that he didn't try to
run down the officers.8 5
84. Defendant Raul Alfredo Munoz was represented by an alternate public
defender. His codefendant was represented by a lawyer of the Los Angeles
County Public Defender's Office. See id. at 11.
85. Transcript of Sentencing at 2-3, People v. Munoz, No. BA 135359 (Su-
per. Ct. for the County of L.A. Jan. 7, 1996) (on file with author). Defense
counsel also argued that defendant felt coerced and intimidated by his co-
defendant to plead guilty after an altercation the two had in court the day be-
fore their plea. See id. at 3. It appears as if the defendants had been offered a"package-deal." Under such a deal, both defendants must plead guilty or the
prosecution will proceed to trial against both. The California Supreme Court
has recognized that "package-deal" plea bargaining, while not impermissible
per se, can be coercive under individual circumstances. See In re Ibarra, 34
Cal. 3d 277, 283, 66 P.2d 980, 983, 193 Cal. Rptr. 538, 541 (1983). Counsel
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The prosecution opposed defendant's request, calling it "clearly
a case of buyer's remorse., 86 The prosecutor claimed that just be-
cause the windshield was broken, it did not mean the officer had
lied.8 7 Without making further inquiry or asking for more investiga-
tion, the judge agreed with the prosecutor and refused to allow Mu-
noz to withdraw his plea. The court then imposed a sentence. Mu-
noz served his time in jail for a crime he did not commit. Long after
his plea and sentence, prosecutors learned from their cooperating
witness that Munoz had been framed by Officers Buchanan and
Liddy.
What is the lesson in all of this? Although there is no guaranty
that asking for a specific factual basis will elicit facts undermining
the prosecution's case, the procedure provides an additional safe-
guard for defendants who are being railroaded by the system. One
wonders whether ift at the time of the guilty plea, defendant Munoz
had been asked specifically about what had occurred in the alley with
the police, the revelations regarding the police officers' conduct
might have come to light earlier.
Too many state court judges have fallen prey to the practice of
routinely skipping over the factual basis when taking a guilty plea.
Because a record of the factual basis is only required in negotiated
pleas, and there is no set requirement for how a factual basis must be
elicited in those cases,8 8 judges tend to pay little attention to the
must be extra diligent in such circumstances to ensure that his or her indiidual
defendant's interests are being served by entering into the plea. See id. at 284,
66 P.2d at 983, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
86. Transcript of Sentencing at 4, People v. Munoz, No. BA 135359 (Super.
Ct. for the County of L.A. Jan. 7, 1996) (on file with author).
87. This theory would later come back to haunt the prosecution when it
criminally charged Officer Buchanan with lying in his report. In defense of the
charge, Buchanan made the same claim the prosecution had made in arguing
against Munoz's motion to withdraw his plea-the officer's report was either
mistaken or the broken windshield did not make a difference as to whether the
officer's testimony was true. See Ann W. O'Neill, Rampart Testimony Pres-
ents 2 Versions of 1996 Gang Sweep, L.A. TWMES, Oct. 24, 2000, at B3.
88. See People v. Wilkerson, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1571, 1576, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d
392, 395 (1992) ('The extent of the inquiry must be left to the discretion of the
trial court, but it should develop the factual basis on the record.").
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factual basis for a plea.89 At most, there is a perfunctory mention to
a stipulation between the parties that such a factual basis exists.
Yet, there are courts that have been concerned about the possi-
bility that innocent people might be pleading guilty to crimes they
did not commit. For example, it is much more typical in federal
court for the judge to conduct a searching inquiry into whether there
is a factual basis for a plea. Not only do federal judges routinely ask
for a detailed factual basis, but they often do it in a manner by which
they can judge whether a defendant is pleading guilty because he or
she committed a crime or because of external pressures. 90
One of the most effective ways to solicit the factual basis for a
plea is by simply asking the defendant, "What did you do?",' If the
89. Some judges are even under the misguided assumption that if the par-
ties have agreed to a plea, the judge is required to accept the plea bargain, re-
gardless of whether there is a factual basis for the conviction. In People v.
West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970), the California Su-
preme Court upheld the use of plea bargaining and held that it was error for
judges to summarily reject plea bargains, even if they include crimes that are
not "necessarily included offenses." See id. at 613, 477 P.2d at 421, 91 Cal.
Rptr. at 397. West does not stand for the principle, however, that judges must
accept any guilty plea, as long as it is agreed upon by the parties. It also does
not reject the notion that there should be a factual basis for a plea. Rather, it
emphasizes that plea bargaining should be used to accurately portray a defen-
dant's criminal conduct and that plea bargaining may help to accomplish this
result. By proposing that judges inquire into the factual basis of a plea, I do
not seek to undermine the practice of plea bargaining. However, the extra pro-
cedure may prevent innocent defendants from entering into such bargains be-
cause they do not believe the court will listen to their accounts of the charged
incidents.
90. In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the Supreme Court
noted the importance of testing the voluntariness of a plea by having detailed,
non-technical discussions with the defendant. Such a discussion occurs both
when the defendant is explained the nature of the charges and when there is a
determination of whether there is a factual basis for the plea. See id. at 646.
91. In Wilkerson, the court suggested the following procedure for eliciting
the factual basis for a guilty plea: "The trial court should ask the accused to
describe the conduct that gave rise to the charge, make specific reference to
those portions of the record providing a factual basis for the plea, or elicit in-
formation from either counsel." Wilkerson, 6 Cal. App. 4th at 1576, Cal. Rptr.
2d at 395; see also People v. Tigner, 133 Cal. App. 3d 430, 434, 184 Cal. Rptr.
61, 63 (1982) (stating that the trial court failed to make an "on-the-record in-
quiry as to a factual basis for appellant's pleas"). While it is permissible for
the court to rely on stipulated portions of preliminary hearing or grand jury
transcripts to determine the factual basis for a guilty plea, see People v. Watts,
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defendant, without coaching, is unable to articulate facts that consti-
tute a crime, the plea is rejected and the case is assigned for trial.
Giving the defendant an opportunity to speak also signals to the de-
fendant that he has a chance to tell the judge directly about any
problems in the prosecution's accusations. 92
Two downsides exist in seeking a more detailed, direct factual
basis for a plea. First, pleas become more time-consuming. Second,
some defendants, who would rather plead guilty regardless of
whether they committed a crime, would now face trials. Neither of
these downsides justifies the current system that has led to the un-
substantiated pleas in the Rampart scandal cases.
Criminal proceedings should be expeditious, but not at the price
of fair adjudication. The process of rapid-fire guilty pleas may need
to change to ensure a higher quality of justice. Given that the guilty
plea may be the only time outside of sentencing that the judge has an
opportunity to interact with the parties, it would behoove the court to
take the time to hear from the defendant.
Additionally, today's criminal justice system places many pres-
sures on defendants to forego their right to trial. For some defen-
dants, it is the cost. For most defendants, it is the extraordinarily
harsh punishments, such as life imprisonment under the Three
Strikes Law. 93 Given the sentencing patterns of the courts, a corol-
lary to recommending that judges take detailed factual bases at guilty
pleas would be that they also refrain from routinely giving maximum
sentences when defendants exercise their right to trial.94 Likewise,
67 Cal. App. 3d 173, 179-80, 136 Cal. Rptr. 496, 500 (1977), such an approach
is less likely to discover situations where defendants are pleading guilty when,
in fact, they are innocent.
92. In those situations where the defendant wants to enter a guilty plea, but
is unwilling to admit culpability, the court may accept a plea of nolo conten-
dere or an Alford plea. See Watts, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 180, 136 Cal. Rptr. at
501. The court is not required to interrogate the defendant personally, but "is
free to utilize whatever procedure is best for a particular case before it to en-
sure that the defendant is entering a plea to the proper offense under the facts
of the case." Id.
93. See, e.g., Rohrlich, supra note 2, at Al (discussing Hobson choice fac-
ing defendant Joseph Jones-plead guilty and serve sixteen months for a crime
he did not commit or risk being convicted at trial and sentenced to life under
the Three Strikes Law).
94. See Tamar Toister, Rampart Hasn't Changed How Criminal Courts Do
Business, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at Bll.
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the court could enhance the validity of pleas by affording defense
counsel sufficient resources and time to prepare an adequate defense
for trial.95
Finally, judges should carefully examine evidence offered in
support of a motion to withdraw a plea. It may not be until after the
guilty plea when a defendant is able to obtain the evidence to demon-
strate that he or she is being framed. The standard of "good cause"
applied to motions to withdraw guilty pleas96 should be interpreted
broadly to provide for withdrawal of pleas when there is clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant is innocent of the alleged
crime.97
E. Recommendation #33: Encourage Diversity and Balance in the
Selection of Judges and Promote Increased Sensitivity
by Judges to the Issue of Police Perjury and Misconduct
Since the Christopher Commission Report, there has been a
greater focus on the type of people hired for law enforcement. 98
People of different race, gender, and life experience bring different
perspectives to their work.99 For example, detailed studies have in-
dicated that female law enforcement officers are generally more
95. A common complaint by defense counsel is that they are often surprised
before trial by the last-minute disclosures by prosecutors and law enforcement.
See id. There is no way of knowing how many defendants, concerned about
the impact of last-minute evidence, chose to plead guilty because their lawyers
may not be fully prepared at trial.
96. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1018 (West 2000); People v. Cruz, 12 Cal. 3d
562, 566, 526 P.2d 250, 252, 116 Cal. Rptr. 242, 244 (1974) (holding that de-
fendant must demonstrate good cause to withdraw plea).
97. The federal courts typically look at the following factors to determine
whether a fair and just reason exists to allow withdrawal of a plea: (1) whether
there has been an assertion of legal innocence; (2) the amount of time between
the plea and the motion; and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced
by withdrawal of the plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) advisory committee's
note (1983 Amendment).
98. See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF THE Los ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT Ch. 4 (1991) [hereinafter Christopher Commission Report].
99. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality
and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REv. 95, 141-48 (1997)




communicative and skillful at de-escalating potentially violent situa-
tions without the use of excessive force. '0
Following revelations of the Rampart scandal, similar sugges-
tions are being made with regard to the court.1' 1 In 1993, a Blue
Ribbon Report on California's judiciary stated, "[t]he virtues of a
culturally diverse court system need no argument. Through its inclu-
siveness such diversity promotes public trust in justice. Through its
diversity such a court system enhances its own cultural compe-
tence."'
0 2
Today, instead of focusing just on the racial and gender break-
down of the court, the question has been raised as to the relative life
experiences of judges. The legitimate question has been asked as to
whether judges who have spent most of their professional lives as
prosecutors are less inclined to be suspicious or critical of law en-
forcement's work.
The assertion is not that a judge who is a former prosecutor
should be precluded from ruling on criminal cases because he or she
is necessarily biased. Rather, the issue is whether the sensitivity of
judges to police misconduct issues can be enhanced by including, to-
gether with judges who have always been in the position of support-
ing the police, judges who come from a professional background of
challenging police actions. Aggressively recruiting lawyers with a
broad range of community and professional experiences could be one
step toward educating the Bench as to the community's broad con-
cerns with police officers.
It is always a delicate task to suggest that judges be more sensi-
tive. Judges have been notorious about resisting sensitivity training,
100. See Christopher Commission Report, supra note 98, at 84.
101. The Report of the Commission on the Future of the California Courts
states: "Ensuring that those who work within the courts-both judicial officers
and other judicial branch personnel--be representative of the populations they
serve can have a salutary effect on public confidence in justice." Comm'N OF
THE FUTURE OF THE CAL. COURTS, JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE: 2020, at 75
(1993). As the then-Presiding Judge of Los Angeles Superior Court, Robert
M. Mallano, stated: "Without an ethnically diverse Bench, there is a height-
ened perception that the judiciary is not for everybody." Id.
102. BLUE RIBBON REPORT ON CALIFORNIA'S JUDICIARY (1993); see also
JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMM. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS IN THE
COURTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURTS 125-38 (1997).
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although it is now a focus at judicial colleges. The immediate nega-
tive reaction by the Bench to the suggestion that the court should
take some responsibility for the Rampart scandal is the best proof of
how the culture of the court must change. One judge issued a public
attack because the Chemerinsky Report dared to report that a federal
judge took the position that police lying is an open secret in our
criminal justice system. 1
0 3
Although it may be embarrassing for the judiciary to admit, the
facts of the Rampart scandal conclusively indicate that police offi-
cers have been getting away with lying on a regular basis. No one is
suggesting that judges have consciously conspired with officers to
undermine justice, but current practices have undoubtedly contrib-
uted to the problem. Either judges have become lax in their evalua-
tion of police officer testimony or law enforcement has become quite
astute in evading the critical evaluation of judges.
As one commentator aptly wrote:
Perjury is often accepted because it can be very difficult to
determine whether a witness is lying .... The difficulty is
increased when a police officer is the witness . . . . The
problem is that some officers have learned to describe in-
vestigations that conform to constitutional requirements-
regardless of the reality of the investigation. Identifying
this form of perjury presents the most difficult problems.0 4
As some members of law enforcement become more sophisti-
cated at misleading the court, the court must become more sophisti-
cated in detecting such misrepresentations. Alerting judges to the
problems with police perjury is an important step in that effort.
103. Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated: "It is an open secret long shared by prosecutors, defense
lawyers and judges that perjury is widespread among law enforcement offi-
cers." Stuart Taylor, Jr., For the Record, AM. LAw., Oct. 1995, at 71. In a
letter to Los Angeles's local legal newspaper, one Superior Court judge criti-
cized the mere reporting of Judge Kozinski's statement as harmful and unfair
to the image of thejudiciary. See Fahey, supra note 3, at 7.
104. Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1321-22
(1994); see also Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumven-
tion of Just Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 725 n. 175
(1996) (noting that the police "code of silence" makes police perjury difficult
to prove, though lawyers and judges know it occurs).
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Including in the rank of judges those persons who, either personally
or through their acquaintances, have experienced police abuses adds
to the pool of judicial expertise. Moreover, giving those who are not
closely allied with the police an opportunity to sit in judgment may
assist in the early detection of police perjury and abuse.
There is a temptation for judges to ignore police perjury and
misconduct because the evidence in a case otherwise indicates a de-
fendant's guilt. 0 5 We need to "encourage a much deeper exploration
of the issue of police credibility than presently occurs in our criminal
courts.' 0 6 To do this, "[j]udges who have been giving the wink and
nod to questionable police testimony, who have been working with
an improper (and frankly illegal) presumption in favor of police wit-
ness credibility must change both practice and perspective.'1°7 Con-
tinuing education of the court, and an influx of judges with varying
attitudes and perspectives, can greatly add to this process.
F. Additional Recommendations
1. Taking claims of ineffective assistance of counsel seriously
In his report, Professor Chemerinsky makes a variety of sug-
gested reforms for all participants in the criminal justice system, in-
cluding prosecutors and defense lawyers. To some extent, the court
has a role in enforcing these recommendations as well For example,
without effective assistance of representation, there is little hope that
the adversary system will ferret out police perjury. It is therefore
imperative that judges critically evaluate claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.
Although the constitutional standards for reversing convictions
on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel are extremely
105. See David N. Dorfinan, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibilin,
26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455 (1999); Andrew J. MeClung, Good Cop, Bad Cop:
Using Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIs L.
REV. 389, 404 (1999); see also Gail Cox, Larry Fidler: LA 's Rampart Judge Is
Strictly Business, RECORDER, Mar. 7, 2000, at 5 (stating Judge Fidler's reac-
tion to the Rampart scandal was problematic because "clearly guilty people in
totally unrelated future cases are going to walk free because jurors no longer
feel they can trust the word of police officers").
106. Dorfman, supra note 105, at464.
107. Id. at465.
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high,' a judge need not stand idly by when it is apparent that coun-
sel is unprepared for a criminal proceeding. It is sometimes apparent
to a judge well before trial or a plea that counsel has failed to inves-
tigate a matter, has not prepared for trial, or has misadvised a cli-
ent.10 9 Judges cannot afford to treat as "sour grapes" a defendant's
complaint about his or her counsel. Given the breakdown of the
criminal justice system in the Rampart scandal, it is imperative that
the court fully investigate any claim that counsel is failing to provide
effective representation.
2. Supervision of prosecution discovery and Brady obligations
Similarly, the Chemerinsky Report recommends that prosecutors
take more seriously their obligations to provide exculpatory materials
to the defense." 0 Once again, while the primary responsibility for
disclosure rests with the prosecutors, it is the responsibility of the
court to monitor the prosecution's compliance. Game playing during
discovery, such as providing the names of additional police witnesses
at the last minute when the defense does not have sufficient time to
investigate their background, should not be tolerated. Neither can
courts tolerate noncompliance with the requirements of Pitchess v.
108. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). One recent
case demonstrates how difficult it is for defendants to overturn a conviction
based upon a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, Calvin
J. Burdine, a defendant in a capital murder trial in Texas, alleged that he was
denied effective counsel because his lawyer slept through trial. In a divided
opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction because "it is impossible to
determine ... that counsel's sleeping" actually hurt Burdine's case. Henry
Weinstein, Judges Reject Appeal in "Sleeping Attorney" Case, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2000, at Al. For a comment highly critical of the Strickland standard,
see Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of In-
effective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the
Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1259 (1986).
109. See, e.g., In re Vargas, 82 Cal. App. 4th 250, 257-63 (2000) (discussing
that failure to prepare a case constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); see
also In re Ibarra, 34 Cal. 3d 277, 283-84, 666 P.2d 980, 983, 193 Cal. Rptr.
538, 541 (1983) (warning that counsel must completely advise a client before
agreeing to a plea bargain on behalf of that client).
110. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (stating that evi-
dence that may impeach the prosecution's witnesses must be disclosed); Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (stating that evidence demonstrating de-
fendant's innocence or lesser culpability for a crime must be revealed).
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Superior Court"' and California Evidence Code section 1043. 12
Recent events have demonstrated that the City Attorney's Office and
the LAPD have been extremely reluctant to provide full access to
personnel records of problem officers." 3 Ultimately, it is the court's
responsibility to ensure that all participants in the criminal justice
system fulfill their obligations to provide defendants with fair pro-
ceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
"What really gets to me is the possibiliy that one of the culprits
in the Rampart Scandal, the judicial system, will get away unscathed
and uncorrected.... 1propose a simple test to see how blameless
the court really is: Who is ultimately responsible for the discretion
to determine what is or is not evidence, what evidence is admissible,
relevant or prejudicial and what juries may see, heat or consider
when deliberating? "114
"Trust is a social good to be protectedjust as much as the air
we breathe or the water we drink When it is damaged, the commu-
nity as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies falter and
collapse. 1115
As the public critically evaluates the causes of the Rampart
scandal, it is inevitable that part of the blame-justifiably or not-
111. 11 Cal. 3d531, 522 P.2d305, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974).
112. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043 (West 2000) (codifying the rules under
Pitchess for disclosure of peace officer personnel files or records).
113. See Tony Ortega, Disorder in the Court, NEW TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at
1.
114. Dan Mariscal, Fault in LAPD Rampart Scandal, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2000, at M4.
115. David N. Dorfian, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibili., 26
AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 460 n.17 (1999) (quoting SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 26-27 (1978)). A recent study of levels
of trust in the judiciary indicated that only thirty-two percent of those surveyed
were extremely or very confident in the work ofjudges. By comparison, forty-
seven percent were very confident in the work of local police. While this study
was conducted on a national level and not specifically in California, it indicates
that judges throughout the nation must work hard for citizens' trust. See AM.
BAR Ass'N, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 50 (1999).
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will focus on the judiciary. Regardless of how responsibility is
apportioned, there is no question that judicial reforms can and should
be instituted to prevent a recurrence of Rampart's injustices.
Recognizing this fact, the court is already instituting some
changes. For example, Supervising Judge Larry Fidler is holding
hearings on whether prosecutors are complying with their ethical ob-
ligations under Brady v. Maryland'1 6 to provide all exculpatory evi-
dence to the defense. He and his colleagues are challenging whether
current laws guarding police personnel files need to be reexamined to
ensure defense access to materials that may impeach police credibil-
ity. Judges are precluding prosecution witnesses when there has not
been timely compliance with discovery orders. Information about
problem officers is being unsealed."
17
Most importantly, the court is earnestly reevaluating the convic-
tions of those whose cases may have been tainted. Approximately
100 cases have been reversed. 1 8 Certainly, the judges in those cases
have seen firsthand how important it is that they take every possible
and lawful step to ensure that only the guilty are convicted.
Hopefully, justices of the California Courts of Appeal and Cali-
fornia Supreme Court will also take note of the issues raised by the
Rampart scandal. They too bear some responsibility. As appellate
judges make it more difficult for defendants to challenge their con-
victions, there is less incentive for those in the criminal justice sys-
tem to hold police officers and prosecutors to exacting standards.
Defendants' rights disappear into the world of "harmless error."' 19 If
meaningful reform is to take place, appellate judges must carefully
examine records to determine if there is factual basis for guilty pleas.
They must also take seriously claims of police misconduct and inef-
fective assistance of counsel.
116. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
117. See Anne La Jeunesse, Judge Lifts Seal on Material in Rampart Case,
L.A. DAiLY J., Oct. 11, 2000, at 1.
118. See Ann W. O'Neill, Testimony Presents 2 Versions of 1996 Gang
Sweep, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000, at B3.
119. See, e.g., People v. Mickens, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1557, 1560-62, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 633, 635-36 (1995) (finding that the judge did not solicit a factual ba-
sis for defendant's guilty plea, but that defense counsel's stipulation, together
with the probation report, was adequate to establish the factual basis).
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The judges of California did not intentionally cause the Rampart
scandal. 120 They can do something, however, to prevent its recur-
rence. By being open to changes in everything from court operations
to judicial attitudes, the court can support prudent reforms that may
prevent future abuses. All it takes is the judicial will to change.
120. None of the criticisms in this Article are intended as personal attacks on
any given judge. Rather, the Rampart scandal has revealed that we have sys-
tematic problems. We have encouraged a destructive passivity by our judges,
encouraging them to look the other way from police misconduct and allowing
them to use procedural shortcuts to survive the overwhelming caseload with
which they are faced. In essence, we have created bad habits and are just be-ginning to realize the enormous consequences of our approach.
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